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The non-looks of the mobile world: a video-based study of interactional adaptation in cycle-lanes

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ABSTRACT

This empirical study uses video data to examine interactional adaptation between cyclists and pedestrians in a relatively new cycle-lane. Existing research on intersections shows order is achieved through the frequent use of a look-recognition-acknowledgement sequence. Whereas this is found in the cycle-lane interactions, there is also an important divergent technique which on the surface seems less cooperative. Others are made to cede space based on ‘doing and being oblivious’, in short, forms of non-looking force others to take evasive action and subtly alter their line of travel. Here the dynamic nature of this obliviousness is shown through empirical examples. Even though it is not always easy to distinguish between the two forms of non-looking, it is concluded that ‘doing oblivious’, whilst possibly annoying for others, is most probably harmless, but there are good reasons to be more concerned about ‘being oblivious’, for it may lead to collisions between pedestrians and cyclists. Aspects of non-looking provide an important addition to knowledge of the mobile world, suggesting we renew attention to specific sites where people concert their movements in minutely detailed ways.

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Introduction

In city streets we ceaselessly encounter strangers using space in different ways; commonly, there are pedestrians on foot, cyclists on bikes, and drivers in cars. Clearly, there are standard ways in which traffic is ordered to minimise the risk of collision, including speed limits, painted lines, warning signs, concrete kerbs, barriers and the like. However, these can never fully regulate human action, something seen in detail in the following video-based study of pedestrian-cyclist interaction in cycle-lanes. For one, as aptly stated by Laurier, Brown and McGregor, ‘Pedestrians do not just walk. They rush, they dawdle, they stroll, they amble, they circle, they pause, they stop, they edge past, they saunter, they plod, they advance, they retreat, they backtrack, they lead, they follow’ (2016, 117). And, as transport scholars have noted, pedestrians are particularly prone to inattention or distraction, even though they are at higher risk of injury in the event of a collision with a cycle or vehicle (Nixon 2014; Thomas and DeRobertis 2013). As noted, the focus here is on cycle-lanes, a space reserved for cyclists, but even brief observation will find pedestrians moving along or across cycle-lanes. Given that both a cyclist and pedestrian can be injured in a collision, when cyclists come close to pedestrians (even those stationary) a key practical task is inferring where next the pedestrian is likely to move. Even a micro-second glance from a pedestrian can show directional intentions to a cyclist, nevertheless, as will be seen below, non-looking is also remarkably common.
Here the complexity of mobility in cycle-lanes is abbreviated to the relatively simple term ‘interactional adaptation’, taken from Esbjornsson, Juhlin, and Weilenmann’s (2007) study of ‘drivers using mobile phones in traffic’. They introduce the term as follows:

drivers rely on a number of resources to adapt talk to the driving situation. ... We call these strategies, by which the driver fits the involvement with the phone with the driving and vice versa, interactional adaptation. Interactional adaptation includes interaction both with people in the immediate surrounding area and with people on the other end of the phone (the remote conversationalists), as well as the interaction with the technologies at hand, such as the car and the phone. (2007, 38–39, original emphasis)

There are many other terms that could be used, but this appeals for several reasons: first, it is formulated for a study of action-in-traffic; second, it can be used as an organising term rather than an all-encompassing concept; and third, it incorporates both the social and material/technological elements of mobile interaction, but from an ethnomethodological base, not the more common actor-network theory approaches (e.g. see Cochoy et al. 2017), which have their own problems (see Lynch 1996). In treating interactional adaptation as a topic for detailed study, no assumptions need be made about ill-consequences of social practices; for example, Esbjornsson et al do not begin from the assumption that phone use while driving is dangerous – such a conclusion should emerge only after detailed study.

Likewise, here I want to empirically examine how cyclists and pedestrians in cycle-lane space adapt their interactions with each other, paying particular attention to the role of looking and non-looking as it unfolds moment-by-moment. Similarly, I make no initial assumption about whether non-looking by pedestrians in a cycle-lane is necessarily a good or bad thing. In my view, adequate analysis of this topic requires video data, a view reinforced by a growing body of work arguing for and adopting so-called ‘naturalistic study’, using video data to analyse the complexity of ‘real life’ traffic. Much of this work reflects developments within ‘transportation research’, which is a positive move, however, the ethnomethodological approach taken here differs in focus, and this deserves comment before proceeding.

Building upon the utility of earlier video-based studies of driving from the early 2000s, some cycling-focused transport scholars now suggest that ‘the most accredited tool to address traffic safety is naturalistic data’ (Dozza and Werneke 2014, 84). Internationally, several research groups have used various means of video data collection, ranging from one or two cameras attached to a bike, sometimes with GPS and other data collection devices, to fixed cameras attached to street poles recording from a higher fixed vantage point. The latter have sometimes resulted in hundreds of hours of video data (see Madsen and Lahrmann 2017), but even the bike-based studies typically record about 100 h of video data (Gustafsson and Archer 2013; Johnson et al. 2010; Werneke, Dozza, and Karlsson 2015). These ‘naturalistic studies’ focus on ‘traffic conflicts’ or ‘risk events’, submitting their data to quantitative cross-tabulation and ‘relative risk’ type analysis. This is useful knowledge, however, given the amount of visual data collected in these studies, it is remarkable how rarely visual material is either provided as part of description, or actually used analytically in the research publications.

Some of this work provides no visual material whatsoever (Johnson et al. 2010), whereas others have only maps and photos of the equipment-laden bikes. The only paper amongst the key studies that does use screensnap-sequences as part of the analysis (Werneke, Dozza, and Karlsson 2015) does so in a very limited manner. The paper includes three lots of dual screensnaps, and one three sequence representation. The latter is captioned as ‘Screenshots (1–3) of a pedestrian who was interacting with a cell phone while crossing the bicycle path without looking for bicyclists approaching’ (206, Figure 7). Critically, it can be noted that there are insufficient screensnaps to convincingly say the pedestrian never looked, moreover the cyclist must be at least 5 m away from the pedestrian, and to the side, at the nearest point, which hardly constitutes a serious ‘risk event’. In short, the screensnaps from the video data are not used to produce a compelling analysis of the moment-to-moment interaction between pedestrian and cyclist, despite this being the mundane content of such a large corpus of video data.
Of course, these transport scholars did not explicitly set out to study ‘interactional adaptation’, thus we need to be careful about making a straw man critique. That said, given the amount of video data these studies have collected, it seems remiss not to at least supplement analysis with careful consideration of the practical details of what people do together when mobile. Any analytical move from video data to a framing of viewed events as ‘a risk’ a ‘near miss’ or simply a ‘conflict’, is a characterisation of action somehow grounded in the practices seen within the video data. That ‘somehow’ requires careful attention. The ethnomethodological approach to detail is not to everyone’s liking, often being accused of ‘pointillist and often isolated case analyses’ (Cochoy et al. 2017, 6), but as Sormani (2016) has recently argued in a reflection on video analysis, given a choice between two major options, ethnomethodology has a well-justified preference. In the choice between ‘why must whatever I say be important? versus what do I have in front of my eyes?’, the latter wins out. This is because ‘it points to the empirical question of how the manifest conduct of practical activities, as the key phenomenon under scrutiny, displays what is crucial to the participants involved, if only to sustain their conduct in situ’ (104). Rather than continue to argue this in the abstract, it is best here to consider a first fragment of video data. This helps show how the second option is not some form of naïve realism, but can be a prompt to careful formation of research topics leading to detailed analysis. Only after this will I outline the context, setting, data and ethics for the current study. Consider Figure 1 which shows a fragment of interaction that looks routine, but on consideration poses an interesting puzzle.

The first two panels are screensnaps from a GoPro camera mounted on my helmet, recording progress as I ride in a cycle-lane (descriptive details will be given below). The last two panels are screensnaps from the video record of a revisit to the site, where an assistant filmed me as I rode past a car parked in the same location as panel 2. The cycle-lane is a visible inscription on the road, constituted by an occasional cycle symbol, but mainly comprised of the space between the kerbside and the dotted white lines alongside the parking spaces. The cycle-lane gives a cyclist preference in this space, but we need to see this as always a matter of interactional adaptation. In brief, the figure shows that about 25 m ahead of me, the woman carrying the bag exits the passenger door of the parked car and slowly walks across the cycle-lane to the footpath, just as a mother and child approach. Instead of moving to the centre of the footpath, the woman stops directly on the kerbside, clearly oriented to the mother and child, who she greets with ‘hello, how are you’, just as I am alongside her. The key thing to note is that her kerbside-stop is not a complete exit from the cycle-lane, as she still protrudes into it, if minimally. She is immobile in this position from when I am about 15 m away, up to at least when I cycle past.

There was no contact between myself and the woman, but panel 3 shows that if I had cycled in the left-most part of the cycle-lane, a collision could have occurred. As panel 4 clearly shows, the above-ground width of a cyclist is wider than the wheel-line, and when riding close enough to the kerbside (as in panel 3) the cyclist’s body can overlap a little into the footpath space. Interestingly, this means that a pedestrian and a cyclist can collide even though both appear to be in their ‘proper’ place. Even the line that was actually ridden – probably very similar to that shown in panel 4 – only leaves about 60 cm between the woman’s body/bag and my body/bike as I cycle past. Hence the puzzle: given that the footpath is of a generous width, and the woman was moving across to it, why does she stand on the kerbside when I am approaching? And, given that this position is maintained, why not from there make a quick glance towards me to show that my approach has been seen?

The second part of this puzzle assumes that the woman has seen me, which seems sensible as she is facing in my direction as I cycle towards her. However, in the absence of a glance towards me, we cannot know for sure. Moreover, there is existing research which shows that both cyclists’ and pedestrians’ practices of looking vary, even when travelling in close proximity to others. As Spinney’s (2008, 156–159) early use of video data in cycling research has shown, inattention – what he calls the ‘glaze’ – is one among many ways of seeing whilst mobile. Through the example of one
cyclist in London, Spinney shows that sometimes our familiarity with road space can lead to an inwardly focused reverie, a kind of detached experience where we may look into the distance, or at nothing in particular. Similarly, van Oldenburg describes a cyclist ‘slacklining’ – riding the dividing line between a cycle and pedestrian path – when there is a long ‘boring’ route (2015, 30).

Figure 1. The puzzling kerbside stop.
Spinney’s emphasis upon the nature of a route and the mobile person’s familiarity with it, has some applicability to the puzzle above. Something not shown in Figure 1 is that when crossing the cycle-lane the woman appears to glance at a ‘for sale’ sign in front of a house just ahead of the car she disembarks from. This might suggest that she is a resident of this location, hence ‘familiarity’ could be a partial explanation for her non-look at the cyclist. Bolstering this inference is the obvious gaze at the approaching mother and child, who she then greets, perhaps suggesting they are all residents. Spinney’s analysis of ‘glazing’ is dependent in part on an interview with the woman videoed while cycling, which does add substance to his analysis, however, the approach taken here differs. In my view, even if an interview with the kerbside woman was possible, we first have to consider the accountability of her actions directly in this locale.

‘Accountability’ is used here in an ethnomethodological sense (see Garfinkel 1967; Lynch 2011). That is, in this situation the absence of a glance towards the cyclist is accountable: given the woman’s liminal position, the cyclist should be her ‘proper object of attention’ (Watson 2005, 214). Whereas it is true that because of the design of the cycle-lane, pedestrians must cross over to get to and from parked cars, the cyclist clearly has ‘priority rights’ (Ivarsson and Greiffenhagen 2015) in this space. Further, exactly as Merlino and Mondada’s analysis of pedestrians crossing streets has shown, ‘it is incumbent upon pedestrians to achieve their visibility in a clear (vs. clumsy, and ambiguous) way’ (2018, 15). Hence, we should not conceptualise crossing-over the cycle-lane as a turn (see Ivarsson and Greiffenhagen 2015), but as movement normatively oriented to getting out of the space. Cyclists should not be conceptualised as taking a turn either, as they have priority rights, though this does not obviate the need to be cautious when riding in the lane, again emphasising that this is a space of interactional adaptation All these factors point to the importance of understanding the accountability of our scene, for both the pedestrian and cyclist, before any recourse is made to individuals’ motives and intentions.

In the dynamic stream of conduct, such as the above interaction, relatively unplanned actions like habitual movements, moments of ‘salience’, and ‘natural reactions’ (Button and Sharrock 1993; Liberman 2013; Lloyd 2017) are arguably more central than planned actions. It follows from this that post-hoc accounts of action (like interviews) cannot give privileged access to the reasons why people do what they do (see Silverman 2017), including how they move in particular ways. On this view, accountability is pursued in terms of what ethnomethodologists call ‘conditional relevance’. As Lynch puts it, this

is a name for what might be called a general property of collaborative production … [meaning] that an action performed by someone at a given time and place is conditioned by, and further conditions, the immediately prior and subsequent actions by others. The idea … describes a concrete, readily observable, property of actions-in-sequence. It is of deep sociological interest because it identifies a general property of linguistic meaning and organisation that does not reduce to structures of mind but is conditioned by concerted and conventional relations among people. (2011, 498)

Conditional relevance does not give us the woman’s reasons for standing there on the kerbside, but importantly it moves inquiry from a focus on her actions as an isolate, to the normative and contingent environment of interactional adaptations. In short, even a micro-second glance from the woman towards the cyclist would have done a lot, but in not-looking she depends upon a lot. Put another way, it is partly because the pedestrian’s non-look is not paired with a non-look from the cyclist, that things proceed smoothly: her non-look makes conditionally relevant the cyclist’s awareness of her position, and the attendant riding of a safe line in the cycle-lane. Hence, this fragment of interaction highlights the contributions of trust and the routine projectability of trajectory to the continued smooth ordering of mobile interaction. Exactly how this occurs deserves our attention, and video data seem well suited to such detailed inquiry.

Within social inquiry, Ethnomethodology offers many examples of fine-grained analysis of fragments of interaction like that above. It has a long history of research into practices of looking, visualisation and embodied conduct (for a review, see Ball and Smith 2011). Building on the
foundational work of Ryave and Schenkein (1974) and Lee and Watson (1993), recently there has been an upsurge in ethnomethodological studies into various aspects of looking while mobile (Haddington, Mondada, and Nevile 2013). Key amongst these studies are: Depperman (2018); Due and Lange (2017); Laurier (2018); Liberman (2013, 2018); McIlvenny (2018); Merlino and Mondada (2018), and Smith (2017a, 2017b). However, apart from brief comment by McIlvenny (2014, 2015) and Smith (2017a, 2017b), none of these studies have focused specifically on looking in interaction between pedestrians and cyclists, nor have non-ethnomethodologists looked closely at interaction in cycle-lanes. Thus, this paper offers a first start on careful empirical work on the ‘looks [and non-looks] of the world for the participants’ (Liberman 2013, 155) in the mobility space of cycle-lanes.

Below, the discussion begins with a description of the context and research setting, the nature of the data, and ethical issues. Then, firstly, we consider moments where a driver or passenger alights from a car and is about to be, or becomes, a pedestrian; secondly, we view pedestrians at bus-stop bypasses; and finally, pedestrians cutting across the cycle-lane. In concluding, I extend the discussion of non-looking to include its possible role in collisions between pedestrians and cyclists.

Context and research setting

New Zealand roads are dominated by the use of private motor vehicles, even though almost 20% of trips are less than 2 km (Chieng, Lai, and Woodward 2017). Wellington is New Zealand’s capital city, with a population in the central city and inner suburbs of just over 200,000, and similar to the nation’s overall statistics it does not have high cycling rates. Nevertheless, a 13% growth rate in cycling was forecast between 2010 and 2014, and partly in response to this the Wellington City Council (WCC) set out to significantly improve cycling infrastructure, budgeting $34.7 million for cycleway construction between 2015 and 2018 (WCC, 2015). The setting for this current study – The Island Bay Cycleway (hereafter IBC) – was one of the first new cycleways, being completed in April 2016. There is some debate about exactly why Island Bay was chosen (see White 2017), as even though it is a relatively busy road – 10,000 vehicles per day (Opus, 2013) – it had a low rate of serious cyclist-injury crashes (2 per year, (Opus 2013)). Existing commuter cycling rates were not high but were increasing, and proponents also pointed out the suburb had a population of over 1000 schoolchildren travelling to the local schools (Wellington City Council 2015). The route of the IBC also carried a bus service, and given the narrowing of the road width to accommodate the new Copenhagen-style cycle-lanes, bus-stop bypasses were included. Both of these features can be seen in Figure 2 which uses a small section of a Google map to show a plan view of the IBC design.

Apart from a 400 m shopping area in the middle of Island Bay, the full length of the 1.2 km road – The Parade – is like that shown in Figure 2. The road is straight and the key features we are interested in are, firstly, the cycle-lanes themselves, and secondly, the bus-stop bypasses. As can be seen, the former are not separated cycle paths (on terminology, see Reynolds et al. 2009, 3), rather they are lanes which run between the footpath and parked vehicles, the latter being adjacent to vehicle traffic, thus giving cyclists some protection from vehicles moving in the main carriageway. The bus-stop bypasses are relatively simple deviations of the cycle-lane onto the footpath area, being marked at their beginning and end by patches of green paint with cycle-symbols. Four bus-stop bypasses were built on both sides of the road, typically occupying 20 m of footpath. On half of these bypasses there is a bus shelter which the cycle-lane moves behind; on the others there is a standard pole and bus-stop signage. Whereas the bus-stop bypass does not alter the whole streetscape, in mixing types of mobile users it has features of ‘shared space design’ (see Hamilton-Baillie 2008; Smith 2017a). In fact, at the time the data were collected the WCC still had a sign up at one of these bypasses, with the words ‘This is a shared space. Cyclists slow down for bus bypasses – pedestrians crossing’. With time even this one sign was removed, and cyclists and pedestrians were
left to make their own interactional adaptations, with only the difference between white concrete and black asphalt, plus a few yellow tiles, to guide them regarding safe use.

**Data and ethics**

Data collection in the IBC was mainly by video-recording. Between November 2016 and January 2017, on six separate occasions, I brought a bike to the cycleway and used a GoPro camera to record just over 4 h of cycling along the cycle-lanes. In working up a first publication on this data (Lloyd, Baddeley, and Snyder 2017) I repeatedly viewed the videos and grew familiar with the various interactions between pedestrians, cyclists and vehicle drivers. In the process, I noted
the importance of eye-contact, or its absence, especially in instances where cyclists and pedestrians were in close proximity. Consequently, I carefully reviewed the full video corpus, selecting specific instances for closer scrutiny, then taking screensnaps of each instance and using them to compile figures that show the sequential flow of interaction.

Video recording in the public place of Island Bay did not require ethical approval. This conforms to the International Visual Sociology Association’s (IVSA) code of research ethics, specifically that recording technology can be used without informed consent where ‘activities involve simply naturalistic observations in public places and it is not anticipated that the recording will be used in a manner that could cause harm’ (Papademas and IVSA, 2009, 256). Nevertheless, the code does strongly recommend that ‘subsequent use of these images must be circumspect’ (255). Following this, all screensnaps used below have been altered using Comic Life software, rendering them in a black and white contrast, making the people shown anonymous but still retaining enough clarity of image to show what people are doing.

Finally, before proceeding to the analysis section, it is important to comment upon limitations of the data. First, because the video is recorded from either a helmet- or handlebar-mounted camera, we do not have a view towards the cyclist’s face showing what the cyclist is attending to and how this varies. When employing video methods some researchers are resorting to the use of multiple cameras on one mobile individual (e.g. see McIlvenny, 2015; McIlvenny 2018), but this technique was not followed here, partly because the research was exploratory in nature. Second, the data offer a limited insight into the audible dimension, that is, the role of sound in interactional adaptation. It can be noted that the bike from which the video record is taken is very quiet on the road, and is not equipped with a bell or horn. Interestingly, in this regard publicly available YouTube cycling videos frequently show that pedestrians can be oblivious to even very loud horns sounded by approaching cyclists (a topic to be pursued in further research). Clearly, video data cannot provide a perfect empirical record of mobility practices in cycle-lanes (see Luff and Heath 2012; Spinney 2011); ultimately, it is up to the researcher to make the best possible analytic use of available data. Even if the research reported here has limitations, as noted above it does mark a departure from the transportation research that offers very limited descriptive visual detail despite the existence of hours of video data.

**Analysis**

**I: Alighting from a car, about to be a pedestrian**

Figure 3 shows the view from the GoPro camera mounted on the cyclist’s helmet as he rides in the cycle-lane and sees ahead a car parked outside some shops.

Prior to the first panel, when the cyclist is about 40 m away, a woman has emerged from the driver’s door and remained by the car. She then opens the door and reaches inside the car; simultaneously, the left rear passenger door pushes open, as shown in panel 1. The cyclist can see at a glance that the pair are about to alight the car, probably to move into the adjacent shops. In doing so, both need to cross the cycle-lane, but given the woman is further away the most obvious concern for the cyclist is the girl pushing open the left passenger door. She is very close to the cycle-lane and thereby constitutes a ‘possible trouble’ if she alights without accounting for the cyclist’s presence.

As the cyclist is about 20 m from the car, the door extends further, but then the girl holding the door sees the approaching cyclist and brings the door in a little (about 30 cm). At this point, as panel 2 shows, the girl has her hand on the door and her left foot on the road, so is only partly outside the car. More importantly, she is directly gazing at the cyclist, and this gaze is held as the cyclist passes the car, being held in total for 4 s. Had the girl emerged from the car onto the road she would not necessarily have stepped into the cycle-lane, nevertheless, from the cyclist’s point of
Figure 3. Holding the gaze and the door.
view the halted movement is an appreciated action. Within this action, the held gaze is central to rendering ‘where next?’ untroubling because the possibility of trouble evaporates as the girl’s ‘I see you’ gaze allows the cyclist to keep cycling ‘knowing’ that she is not about to step into the cycle-lane until he has passed.

In the actions shown in figure three, nothing much seems to have happened, but on inspection a whole lot has happened. One way to realise this is to think about alternative courses of action. One would be for the girl to entirely close the door and wait for the cyclist to pass before opening it. This might seem a very safe option, one that entirely respects the cyclist’s ‘priority rights’ in the cycle-lane, however, it faces the disadvantage of restricting the cyclist’s view of the passenger who wishes to alight the car. In other words, here the ‘seen being seen’ reciprocity has important benefits. By holding the door partly open as she also holds the gaze, the girl produces a relatively unequivocal non-verbal communication: ‘I see you seeing me and I am not about to move into your space’. This is recognised by the cyclist, as indicated by his clear passage past without slowing down. As such, this is a wonderful example of what Goffman calls ‘intention displays’:

...in driving and walking the individual conducts himself – or rather his vehicular shell – so that the direction, rate, and resoluteness of his proposed course will be readable. In ethological terms, he provides an ‘intention display’. By providing the gestural prefigurement and committing himself to what it foretells, the individual makes himself in to something that others can read and predict from. (1972, 32)

Goffman suggests that intention displays are employed at ‘proper strategic junctures’; changing from a passenger to a pedestrian near a cycle-lane is exactly such a strategic juncture. In this, the moments of gaze and the use of material objects, in a rule-governed space, are the key details of how cyclists and pedestrians produce and recognise orderly coordinated actions when movement into the cycle-lane is intended.

A slightly different example of emergence from a car is presented in Figure 4.

As the cyclist takes a small divergence in the cycle-lane, he clears a parked car and ahead of it sees an opened car door, clearly impeding his progress in the cycle-lane (panel 1). A mother with a baby is getting something from the car, thus is unaware of the approaching cyclist. But, as seen in panel 2, when the cyclist is about 5 m away, she does glance up and immediately proceeds to reach for the car door and draw it inwards so the cyclist can pass safely (panel 3). In contrast to the prior example where the opened car door did not impinge into the cycle-lane, here it does. This breach of the ‘priority rules’ regarding who has the right to be in the cycle-lane is very easily repaired – the door is instantly grasped and moved inwards, at the same time the mother says ‘oh, sorry’. In this case even though there is still room for the cyclist to pass, a held gaze and held door is not sufficient: the ‘proper’ thing to do is seen at a glance, then done, with an apology. Clearly, here we are dealing with a package of normative actions. When a pedestrian is observably impinging into the cycle-lane, an apology is an expected action to be added to the held-gaze and drawn-in door. In conversation-analytic terms the ‘oh, sorry’ might be called an ‘oh-prefaced apology’, where the ‘oh’ is not a marker of change in epistemic state due to a spoken prior turn, but is a response to an observed trouble in the ongoing mobility activity (Keisanen 2012, 216).

Again, this is all very routine and predictable. Nonetheless, we have to emphasise that it is a produced mundane order, something already emphasised in the introductory discussion of Figure 1, and to be taken up below. Next, we move to consider interaction in the bus-stop bypasses.

II: The bus-stop bypass

Faced with the issue of where bus-stops should go given limited road width, the design solution was to divert the cycle-lane off the road and onto the footpath, creating a shared space for pedestrians and cyclists. Various features were used to make clear that at these
There is nothing definitive to say that these women have to be pedestrians waiting for a bus, but in everyday life this is precisely what ‘anyone can see’ at a glance. Adapting Hester and Francis (2003) ‘observer’s maxim’, we can say that if pedestrians are seen standing close to a bus stop, then indeed we see them as waiting for a bus. For the approaching cyclist, such seeing has an important implication: the woman standing closest to the cycle-lane has a predicated future movement. That is, at some stage, she will move across the cycle-lane to board a bus. For the approaching cyclist, the exact moment of this move is unknown, as any approaching bus is behind him, consequently her stationary position has to be looked for and attended to rather than just assumed. Further, it can be suggested that the pedestrian herself is reciprocally aware of the cyclist’s interest in
knowing her mobility intentions. That this is not conjecture can be seen through close scrutiny of the details of Figure 5. In panel 1, we see the young woman standing about 30 cm from the white concrete of the cycle-lane, looking in a direction that is both towards the approaching cyclist and towards where her bus will sooner or later appear. In panel 2 we see that there is a slight turn in her body rightwards, brought about by her right foot being moved back from the cycle-lane.

**Figure 5.** Looking for the bus, last second glance at cyclist.
contrast to the woman standing on the kerbside overlapping into the cycle-lane (Figure 1 above), she has explicitly added to her seeing of the cyclist’s approach a noticeable movement back from the cycle-lane.

Panels 3 and 4 provide evidence of another interesting feature of this action. In panel 3, the woman’s direction of view appears to be past the cyclist towards the road where the bus will be approaching, but in panel 4 we see a definite redirection of gaze straight toward the cyclist. It looks very much like one side of mutual eye contact with the cyclist. We do not have the benefit of another camera showing the cyclist’s gaze, but that hardly matters for what we have here adds nicely to the point made about preferred courses of action in such situations. In short, the atypical or dispreferred pedestrian’s action is not to make eye contact with, or directed glance towards, the cyclist. The gaze or glance, along with movement of a car door inwards, or a foot backwards, offers a clear intention display for the approaching cyclist. It is precisely such details that allows the cyclist to proceed smoothly along the cycle-lane. Conversely, to the extent that the pedestrians see the cyclist’s seeing of their seeing, they too know that the mundane order of the cycle-lane is in place.

Before focusing on the absence of such looking, we can consider two examples which show the fine detail of the work of gaze and glance. Consider Figure 6.

Prior to panel 1, both the man and woman behind the bus shelter had been standing in the middle of the cycle-lane. But when the cyclist enters the bypass the man glances up, sees the cyclist and steps off the cycle-lane. As we have seen from the prior example, this is norm-conforming behaviour, but the interesting thing here is how a look is used to shift the woman who has not followed suit and remains standing in the cycle-lane. As panel 2 shows, the man turns and gazes at the woman, who seeing the gaze, only then begins to move off the cycle-lane. No words are uttered to effect this action; then the man turns and re-engages gaze with the cyclist who continues to cycle forward. This is all very mundane, occurring across a few seconds, nonetheless, it serves as a powerful example of the subtle power of eye contact. Not only is looking coupled with self-compliance with priority rules, but it can also be used to help ensure compliance by other pedestrians.

The next example also involves a case where a duo of pedestrians are similarly in the cycle-lane, and it can be used to introduce Liberman’s important distinction between ‘doing and being oblivious’ (2013). Consider Figure 7.

In panel 1, just visible through the bus shelter glass, two women are consulting the digital readout indicating bus arrivals, after which they move off walking along the cycle-lane. Panel 2 shows that one of this pair actually turns back to look towards the bus shelter, exactly when the cyclist is alongside it, just when her companion is in the cycle-lane. Thus, the cyclist’s presence in the cycle-lane riding towards them would be detectable, and implicative for their very own crossing of the cycle-lane slightly ahead. Despite this, the pair continue walking across the cycle-lane, in this case forcing the cyclist to slow. Interestingly, as shown in panel 4, it is after having moved off the cycle-lane onto the footpath, that the woman on the left glances directly back at the cyclist. As far as can be ascertained from the video data, only the taller woman has seen the approaching cyclist.

A useful piece of empirical research related to this example is Liberman’s (2013) chapter on ‘the local orderliness of crossing Kincaid’, a busy street intersection mixing vehicles, cycles and pedestrians. Whereas pedestrians generally look at other road users and want their looking to be seen, Liberman notes an interesting exception to do with obliviousness. He suggests this is a skilled practice, employed by pedestrians and drivers alike, as a means for securing rights to the intersection irrespective of road rules. In essence, a crosser employs any of a range of methods not to look at a competing vehicle driver, the latter ceding priority to the one being oblivious. The interesting subtlety to this is a distinction between being oblivious and doing oblivious, for ‘some crossers are really oblivious, and it is obvious that other crossers are simply pretending to be oblivious’ (29). Liberman claims that being oblivious will always trump doing oblivious. A similar point has been noted by both Jensen (2010) and Laurier (2010).
Figure 6. A gaze used to shift another pedestrian.
discussion is more conceptual, whereas like Liberman, Laurier draws attention to the central importance of seeing:

drivers exploit the visibility of the absence or presence of noticing one another. Where both cars have rights to go ahead, particularly in seriously congested roads . . . they will try and avoid letting the other driver see that they have seen them. If one has not seen the other, then for the one who has seen the other, they ought to let them through because they cannot rule out that the other driver genuinely has not see them. (2010, 74, original emphasis)

In the example above, if the taller woman has seen the cyclist, the action of continuing to walk across the cycle-lane seems a type of ‘doing oblivious’. In contrast, the other woman has not seen the cyclist, thus her gaze back at him after walking across the cycle-lane almost seems to account for ‘being oblivious’ – a kind of ‘oh, I didn’t see you there’ gaze. Here the claim that she is ‘being oblivious’ seems justified because she is walking away from the cyclist, which was not the case with the woman standing on the footpath kerb (the introductory example in Figure 1). It is through such comparative analysis that we can be more precise in our discrimination between doing and being oblivious, hence next we consider examples of pedestrians facing towards the approaching cyclist. Consider Figure 8.

Figure 8 shows 2 pedestrians walking along a bus-stop bypass where there is no bus shelter. Three screensnaps for each pedestrian show remarkably similar actions. In the top panels, when the cyclist is about 10 m away, both pedestrians are routinely walking towards the cyclist in the cycle-
lane. Shortly, for both pedestrians there is a discernible move to the right off the cycle-lane and onto the black asphalt of the footpath, but this movement is entirely achieved without a glance towards the cyclist. As most clearly seen in panel 3, but also seen in panel 6, the pedestrians are looking downwards and away from the cyclist. In short, they are doing oblivious. A characterisation of them as being oblivious seems incorrect, because, firstly, they are walking towards the cyclist,
thus they see him, and relatedly, because they have made a discernible movement out of the cycle-lane. So, here it is the absence of a glance towards the cyclist that is key in characterising their actions as ‘doing oblivious’, but it seems important to add that their subtle movement off the cycle-lane nonetheless shows interactional adaptation at work.

Just like the woman on the kerbside, there is nothing egregiously dangerous in the two pedestrians walking along the cycle-lane, as the cyclist can see them and is hardly likely to ride directly into them. Nonetheless, in this situation the onus is again on the cyclist to act reasonably and commonsensically: to not be adamant and formalistic about the cycle-lane being a space where cyclists have priority rights. As noted, this is precisely why we might expect a pedestrian to offer a glance towards the cyclist, as seen in many of the examples above. Despite the ease of making an eye-contact that supports minor courtesies, the non-glance of doing oblivious seems quite common. This is consistent with Lee and Watson’s argument that ‘whilst being the object of another’s gaze and consequent social expectations may be conceived in terms of social control, it may also be conceived as a resource which members artfully and creatively use’ (1993, 82). Doing oblivious seems to fit with such artful and creative use. Having established this we can now move to the final section and consider situations where such obliviousness raises some concerns about safety and possible collisions in the cycle-lane.

III: Cutting across the cycle-lane when a task is involved

There are two occasions in the data when the same man can be seen walking across the cycle-lane to a parked van. It was discovered that the man was a tradesman who has a large garage for storing tools of his trade, and he parks two vans outside the garage to transfer materials and go about his work. Figure 9 shows one of the occasions when he walks across the cycle lane in this activity.

In panel 1, the cyclist is quite a distance away, hence the blurriness of the image. From the video data, it is not possible to say whether the tradesman looks into the cycle-lane before crossing, but certainly there is a purposeful and unbroken striding across the cycle-lane to the van. Interestingly, the gap between panel 1 and 3 is 9 s, that is, for a considerable time the tradesman is standing at the van door without opening it. As can be seen, the van is parked over the continuous white line bordering on the broken white line. Consequently, standing there at the car door the tradesman is in the cycle lane, and remains in this position as the cyclist passes (just after panel 3). In the other example in the data, he opens the sliding door of the van and is busy leaning into the van, so the events of Figure 9 appear a little unusual, though it is not difficult to surmise what might be going on. It seems reasonable to suggest that he may be holding a cellphone and using it in some way, or that he may be holding a bunch of keys trying to locate the van key (he is standing right where a door key can be inserted). Close inspection of the video suggests it is the latter, but whatever it is that he is doing in front of the van door, it is occupying his attention. He is engaged in a task, seemingly paying no attention to his position standing in the cycle-lane with his back turned to the approaching cyclist.

In regard to the above discussion, clearly this is an example of being oblivious. Certainly, there is still plenty of space for the cyclist to pass, however, this is much more disconcerting for the cyclist than those situations where pedestrians doing oblivious are mostly facing forward to the cyclist. At panels 2 and 3, because the tradesman’s back is turned to the cycle-lane he may be unaware of the cyclist, and, for the cyclist, the answer to where the tradesman will go next is unknown. It could be remaining stationary, but equally, it could be a movement into the van, or a movement backwards from the van. The latter would be troubling as it could produce a collision with the cyclist. The cyclist would not be at fault if any such collision occurred, but ‘being in the right’ is not much comfort if there is resultant injury and damage. Again, the onus is on the cyclist to be cautious, even though a cycle-lane is a space intended for cyclists.
Figure 9. Task preoccupation and being oblivious.
It is interesting to reflect here on the cyclist’s response to this situation, and to consider just what constitutes ‘being cautious’. As noted, the cyclist has seen the tradesman ahead in the lane for quite some time. From the video it can be seen that about 15 m before the man’s location by the van door, the cyclist does slow down, but thereafter the same pace is maintained as he passes the van. This is perhaps expectable, but there is an interesting point to speculate on here. It is this: could it not be that within a few metres of the man, the cyclist could sensibly speed up? That is, given a sensing that the man’s future movement could be a possible risk, one response would be to get past the site of danger as quickly as possible. This response would have the related complication that in the event of the man stepping back and a collision ensuing, it would occur at greater speed. There is existing research showing such ‘speeding up’ occurring: Liberman (2013, 16) shows car drivers speeding up to turn in front of crossing pedestrians, and Jensen (2010) observes cyclists in a shared space area speeding up to pass pedestrians and vehicles. So, there is good reason to believe that a cautionary slowing down may not always be what a cyclist does as interational adaptation when confronted by potential risk ahead; indeed, speeding up could be quite common.

The important consequences of task preoccupation seen above can be furthered with one last short example. Consider Figure 10.

The two panels show a man at the back of a van parked beside some shops. He is clearly about to take some items from the opened back of the van into the shops, thus needing to cross the cycle-lane, which here moves left o of the road into quite a long bus-stop bypass. The simple thing seen in this figure is that despite the proximity to the cycle-lane, in the man’s movement to cross the cycle-lane there is no initial look back to check for approaching cyclists – he turns and moves without a backward glance. Just after panel 2, the man’s head turns and he will see the cyclist, who is about a metre away, but to repeat, seeing the cyclist occurs after the man is already moving to cross the cycle-lane. Thus, this seems to be another example of being oblivious occasioned by task preoccupation. Again, no collision occurs, but it is a similarly worrying situation for the cyclist.

Conclusion

Through paying careful attention to video data, we have seen the ways that cyclists and pedestrians practice interactional adaptation in the material space of the cycle-lane and bus-stop bypasses. In this the putative ‘rules of the road’ need to be bracketed, which is not to suggest that in the mobile world ‘anything goes’, rather it is to draw attention to how participants coordinate, then and there, their travel through cycle-lane space. Looking is a key part of this coordination of action, as well established in Liberman’s study of ‘Crossing Kincaid’: ‘The pedestrian is not only looking but doing so in a manner that renders his looking as witnessable and recognizable as looking. It is a public display of looking, an engagement in social interaction, and not just any social interaction but a diligent concern for the interaction that remains to be organized by the parties there’ (2013, 22).

When a cyclist is seen moving in the cycle-lane, there is a contingent space on both sides of the lane, which if occupied by the pedestrian, means they have participation status in the cycle-lane, and are therefore accountable for what they do. The kerbside and the dotted white line are the obvious boundary markers, but these should not be treated as fixed instantiations of rules, as the material embodiment of both the cyclist and pedestrian will vary, with consequence for normal position and projected trajectory. For example, the kinaesthetics of a cyclist carrying a guitar across her back should incorporate the carried width of the guitar, and any pedestrian seeing a body-guitar-bike assemblage might sensibly adjust their position, even if they were within the footpath or car-park space. Such contingency and the tacit dimensionality to space mean that the road code and its rules will never be sufficient to ensure mobile order.

To think in this way is not to suggest that all use of road space proceeds smoothly, as highlighted above in the discussion of ‘doing and being oblivious’. Whereas no actual collisions
resulted from the obliviousness seen in the video data, it is not hard to work out how this could happen. Shortly prior to the time of writing, there was a widely reported collision between a cyclist and pedestrian in the IBC. Journalists (Cann and Swinnen 2017; Stewart 2017) described how a pedestrian stepped out into the cycle-lane and was hit and knocked unconscious by

Figure 10. More task preoccupation.
a cyclist. She was taken to hospital, needing reconstructive surgery to her eye-socket, cheek, jaw and nose. The cyclist was also taken to hospital with significant injuries, including a broken shoulder and hip damage. The precise chain of events leading to the collision are unknown, but the pedestrian did admit fault, the inference being that she did not look before stepping into the cycle-lane.

This provides food for thought and a final connection with Liberman’s work on obliviousness. As seen above, examples of ‘doing and being oblivious’ were notable departures from the expectation that pedestrians will display ‘due diligence’ when crossing the cycle-lane. On this Liberman has a stimulating observation. He describes a situation where three woman attempt to cross in front of a bus who had the right of way, one of the women stalling because there is no recognition from the bus-driver. Liberman comments that, ‘But of course it is a [Recognition] that never came, for there are few practices at Kincaid more hopeless than waiting for the [Recognition] of a bus driver. Bus drivers are too experienced and know better than to give away their phenomenal field …’ (2013, 24, brackets in original). It seems then that the ‘professional vision’ (Goodwin 1994) of the bus driver includes the normal practice of non-recognition of pedestrians’ doing oblivious. Liberman does not develop this further, but this can be connected to the current study, particularly the point that travelling through the intersection is the bus driver’s routine job.

In the empirical detail above, both men involved in being oblivious do so in the course of their work. The tradesman is moving to and from his garage to his van; the van salesman is taking products from the van to the shop. Their lack of visual attention to the cycle-lane is connected to their accomplishment of practical tasks. Thus, it is perhaps not so much their familiarity with the space of movement which is key (see Spinney above), but a concerted focus on the job at hand, rendering cyclists in the cycle-lane hidden in plain sight. How often this leads to collisions is unclear, but one thing we can say with certainty is that in such situations safety is strongly dependent on the cyclist exercising diligent looking at such obliviousness. As Watson (2005) has argued, public space is usually an environment of normal appearances based upon a ‘display-monitoring pair’. Extending this, it can be argued that any first person being oblivious weakens the display part, making the monitoring work of any second person much more crucial. Simply, collisions may happen when that monitoring work is insufficient or absent. As Spinney (2008) and other work has shown, cyclists can indeed ‘glaze’ when riding in urban space, so the details of where and when that happens become crucial. Clearly, my analysis of the video data cannot describe the full sensory context of doing and being oblivious, but it does provide a tantalising connection to inexplicable events like stepping into a cycle-lane without looking, then being hit by a cyclist. To better understand what happens when differently mobile people interact in cycle-lanes, we must return to close scrutiny of the looks and non-looks of the everyday mobile world.

Notes

1. The most relevant non-ethnomethodological work on cycling-pedestrian interaction that uses video data is Brown (2012), Delaney (2016), Latham and Wood (2015), and Simpson (2017). However, much like Spinney (2008), all this work has a geographic emphasis on space/infrastructure and does not go into the fine detail of situated interaction in cycle-lanes.

2. Along with proponents keen to see the cycling infrastructure built, there was significant opposition to the plan (see White 2017). Consistent with international experience, opposition from some local residents and business owners developed into a full scale case of ‘bikelash’ (Wild et al. 2017). Ultimately, the city council was forced to re-consult residents and interested others, agreeing to rebuild the infrastructure, just over a year after its completion. At the time of writing, rebuilding has not yet begun.

3. Even though the author is the cyclist, henceforth second person pronouns – he, the cyclist – are used in the description. This seems more consistent with the aim of showing how the conditional relevance of actions are a general property of social organisation.
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